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Preface 
The Danish food industry faces pressures to increase value-added and to improve ef-
ficiency.  At the same time, policy increasingly targets industry conduct and the at-
tributes of food products such as their safety, and ethical issues of their raw material 
production.  Recognizing that food quality attributes are delivered by co-ordinated ac-
tion amongst food industry firms, the research presented here examines relationships 
and incentives within the food marketing chain.  
 
This research is part of the 3-year project “Perspectives for Development of the Dan-
ish Food Sector”.  The project targets the policy environment surrounding the Danish 
food marketing chain, and has objectives to: 
 
1. measure changes in function, structure and commercial practice in the Danish 
food industry, and compare and contrast these with developments in other 
countries; 
2. characterize vertical and horizontal relationships in the Danish food chain, 
and their role in efficiency; 
3. evaluate the efficiency and competitiveness of the Danish food system at 
each stage of the marketing chain; 
4. review and evaluate instruments of Danish, EU and foreign public policy in 
the development of the food marketing chain; and 
5. communicate research results in a number of media. 
 
The research reported here is associated with objectives 2, 3 and 4.  Efficiency in the 
provision of food quality attributes by the Danish food marketing chain is examined.  
A mathematical program is used to model incentives for provision, which include 
firms’ free-riding behaviour within the food chain.  Scenarios presented include a 
range of technological conditions; the allocation of retail price premia amongst 
stages; and the implications of mandatory provision of an unprofitable attribute.  Re-
sults list provision outcomes, profitability and its distribution amongst chain partici-
pants, and the implications of non-provision by firms.  
 
Commercial applications of the research include its focus on within-chain compensa-
tion.  Notably, the model generates measures of profits and loss that can be applied in 
designing new compensation regimes.  Desirable extensions to the research include it 
use of more detailed and accurate input data, and comparison of its output to com-
mercial profitability and compensation patterns.  Policy applications include its treat-
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ment of options for design of mandatory provision, and interactions between market 
power and the allocation of benefits within the food marketing chain. 
 
The project is partially funded by the Innovations Law of the Danish Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture.  Early versions of the models and early drafts of the report were re-
viewed by Jørgen Dejgaard Jensen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Danish Research Institute of Food Economics, September 2004. 
 
 
Søren E. Frandsen 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Food products are marketed as a composite of attributes.  Attributes desired by con-
sumers extend beyond nutrition to include food safety, environmental concerns, con-
venience and ethics (Caswell, 1998; Henson and Traill, 2000).  The complete list of a 
product’s (infinite number of) attributes fully defines its quality.  Empirical work uses 
a shorter list, such as Hooker and Caswell’s (1996), that subdivided quality into five 
categories (see table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1.  Examples of food quality attributes  
 
Categories of food quality attributes 
Food Safety Nutritional Value Packaging Process 
• Food-borne pathogens 
• Heavy metals 
• Pesticide residues 
• Food additives 
• Naturally-occurring tox-
ins 
• Veterinary residues 
• Fat 
• Calories 
• Fibre 
• Sodium 
• Vitamins 
• Minerals 
• Purity 
• Compositional in-
tegrity 
• Size 
• Appearance 
• Taste 
• Convenience of 
preparation 
• Package mate-
rials 
• Labelling 
• Other informa-
tion 
• Animal welfare 
• Biotechnology 
• Environmental impact 
• Pesticide use 
• Worker safety 
 
Source: Hooker and Caswell (1996)  
 
 
The Danish food marketing chain offers consumers a range of sophisticated food at-
tributes in what is reckoned to be a high-cost environment (National Committee on 
Pig Production, 2004; Danish Poultry Council, 2004).  In Denmark’s increasingly 
concentrated food industry (Baker, 2003), co-ordinated action amongst food chain 
participants is becoming more commonplace and more demanding (Esbjerg, 1999).  
Such co-ordination involves the development and use of mechanisms for allocating 
and sharing costs and rewards arising from attribute provision (Strandskov et al., 
1999).   
 
Commercial initiatives within the food marketing chain include Efficient Consumer 
Response management systems (ECR - King and Pomphiu, 1996) and the EUREP-
GAP initiative in the European fruits and vegetables chain (Brouwer and Bijman, 
2001).  Addressing longer term development in products and processes, Boon (2001) 
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examines the means by which linkages between stages of the food marketing chain 
facilitate innovation in four Danish food-farm sectors. 
 
Under-provision of food quality attributes is frequently used as a justification for pol-
icy intervention.  Across a range of food sectors, Danish firms interpret policy inter-
ventions as cost increasing, but those costs may be able to be passed on down the 
food chain as price increases (Baker et al., 2004).  In the case of food safety, Danish 
action has featured chain co-ordination and public-private partnership in some cases.  
Wegener et al. (2003) describe these elements of control programmes for Salmonella 
in pork, chicken and shell eggs, which focused on “pre-harvest controls” (i.e. action at 
farm level) rather than (downstream) bacteriological testing “because of the higher 
cost involved and logistical problems”.  Dansk Industri’s (2002) survey of food indus-
try firms found that the broader topic of “food quality” was addressed in a less co-
ordinated way: responding firms tended to allocate the responsibility for quality to 
other members of the food marketing chain, in the manner of free-riders.   
 
Identifying and reacting to under-provision is thus a problem confronting food indus-
try firms, co-ordinated food marketing chains, and government.  The current paper 
addresses the efficiency with which consumer demand for food product attributes 
might be satisfied by the Danish food marketing chain.  In particular, provision is 
possible at more than one stage of the chain, and can occur in portfolios of products 
with a particular attribute and as products with multiple attributes.  Moreover, provi-
sion occurs under a range of competitive conditions that alter and offset technological 
considerations.  The current paper examines these factors using indicative data, and 
identifies implications of policy responses to perceived under-provision. 
1.2. Attribute provision in the food marketing chain 
Representation of the food marketing chain 
The food marketing chain is often viewed as “a vertical slice of the economy” 
(Wright, 1996), wherein a vertical array of agents pass products between stages.  Tra-
ditional analysis has envisaged markets operating between stages, and flows of prod-
uct and information moving along the chain.  Recent interpretations include dynamic 
shifts of product and input flow (Boehlje and Sonka, 1998; Collins, 2001), complex 
cyclical information flows (Kinsey and Senauer, 1996), and the conversion of discrete 
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stages into “channels”, featuring cost and demand interactions (Price, 2002; Hughes, 
2002).   
Measurement of attribute provision 
Antle (2001) presents a theoretical model of quality provision, where quality is as-
sumed to be a measurable continuous variable.  However, most empirical studies of 
attribute-specific costs and revenues are based on all-or-nothing scenarios (i.e. provi-
sion or non-provision).  Examples include studies of costs of control of individual 
contaminants or pathogens in the meat industry by Jensen et al. (1998) and Narrod et 
al. (1999).  Examination of how such costs change over a range of levels of effective-
ness (Antle, 2000) has been used to introduce quasi-continuity of attribute variables. 
 
Studies of the cost impacts of environmental policies on the food industry have also 
used all-or-nothing attributes, as in Gren’s (1994) study of farm-level responses to 
policies on pesticide use.  Maltsberger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000) compare grain 
handling costs “with” and “without” the traceability attribute, and Offermann and 
Nieberg (2002) take the same approach to study the costs of provision of organic farm 
produce. 
 
On the revenue side, Hobbs (2003) estimates retail price premia for selected attributes 
(information about the food safety and traceability status of sandwich fillings) in an 
all-or-nothing format.  Hobbs also treats combinations of attributes as separate attrib-
ute specifications.  Govindasamy et al. (2001) use a logistic regression approach to 
estimate willingness to pay for the all-or-nothing variable “integrated pest manage-
ment produce”.  Galletto (2003) reports livestock price premia at slaughter to com-
pare organic/non-organic animals in one market in Italy.  Caswell’s (1998) national-
level policy analysis treats food safety as a “with” and “without” attribute.  
Information and attributes 
Consumers’ purchasing decisions are motivated by information about the product, 
rather than the product itself.  That information becomes known to the consumer ei-
ther at purchase or after purchase, or perhaps not at all (Nelson, 1970).  The informa-
tion shortfall is overcome by “signals”, the best known of which are brands and cer-
tificates. Some signals are provided by government (e.g. Danish Ø-marque organic 
certification), others mandated by government (e.g. identity preservation in the meat 
marketing chain) and others are voluntarily provided by firms (e.g. statements on egg 
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containers about the housing conditions of the producing hens).  Wegener et al. 
(2003) describe voluntary Salmonella classification systems for pigs in Denmark, and 
the generalised strength of the Danish food safety system that allowed beef sales to be 
largely unaffected during health scares elsewhere in Europe.  
 
The current paper interprets signalling as part of attribute provision, but it is recog-
nised that this is a significant simplification.  In particular, signals are often generated 
by agents other than those that provide attributes, and by coalitions of agents (e.g. a 
co-operative or a firm that owns many plants).  The inclusion of signalling costs is a 
logical extension of the model developed in this paper, but is not considered further 
here.  
1.3. Attribute provision incentives 
Revenues 
Consumers’ willingness to pay for a product attribute is expressed as a price premium 
at the retail stage of the food chain.  A share of this premium is passed to the next 
agent on the food chain, from whom the retailer buys the product (distributors, whole-
salers, processors).  Shares of that share are passed to members of the food chain fur-
ther upstream, and onwards to farmers and suppliers of farm services and inputs.  At 
each stage of the chain, firms’ attribute-related revenues reflect both the size of the 
premium and the share received.  All firms in the food marketing chain receive non-
negative attribute-related revenue, regardless of which member of the chain provides 
the attribute.   
Technology 
Provision incurs costs.  Although firms at non-providing stages of the food chain do 
not incur provision costs, they may face some costs associated with preserving the at-
tribute through to sale (e.g. separate storage) or presenting it for sale (e.g. separate 
space in a display freezer).  Non-provision costs are not considered further here, but 
are a simple extension of the model presented below. 
 
Provision technologies are likely to feature economies of scale. This might result 
from allocation of fixed costs (e.g. per unit costs of certification programmes will be 
lower, the higher the volumes handled) or convex technologies (e.g. reduced chilling 
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costs from full utilisation of chilling space, or efficiencies from larger pipe diameters 
in flow processes).  
 
Provision technologies are also likely to feature economies of scope.  These might 
have two manifestations: cost savings from providing the same attribute across differ-
ent products (e.g. applying an existing vegetable organic certification system to a fruit 
product line); and cost savings from providing more than one attribute to the same 
product (e.g. organic chicken would normally qualify as free range chicken).  Nota-
bly, these scope economies can work in reverse (e.g. provision of free range livestock 
will add significant costs to any attempt at provision of product that is free of con-
tamination by a specific bacterium). 
 
The current paper sketches those relationships and costs, and derives alternative at-
tribute provision outcomes.  The impacts of each outcome on profitability and effi-
ciency are examined.  The potential for between-stage compensation is examined by 
using two contrasting objective functions (whole-chain optimisation and single-stage 
optimisation) and by examining dual values. 
Uncertainty 
Although both the size of the premium and the share received are subject to uncer-
tainty, the following assumes that they are both known in magnitude and certain in 
occurrence.  Similarly, cost characteristics are also assumed known.  Relaxing such 
assumptions represents a potential extension of the model developed here, although 
maintaining them does not detract from the analysis as presented. 
1.4. Issues of efficiency 
Least-cost provision 
An intuitively efficient result is that provision occurs at the stage of the food chain 
featuring the lowest provision cost.  However, whether or not that occurs also de-
pends on profitability, namely the size of available price premia and the share allo-
cated to the firms at each stage.  Where costs feature economies of scale and scope, 
the portfolio of products and attributes for a firm at each stage will also influence the 
provision decision.  
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Externality 
For a firm, attribute provision requires a positive profit outcome at that firm’s stage of 
the food marketing chain.  For the chain as a whole, attribute provision is desirable if 
benefits to the entire chain exceed costs to the whole chain.  Because costs of provi-
sion may accrue to just one stage and benefits accrues to all, then the potential exists 
for a market failure: all stages have the incentive to let other stages provide the attrib-
ute.  
Compensation 
Single-stage optimisation that features under-provision may be (theoretically) over-
come by compensation of one stage of the food marketing chain by another.  In this 
way an optimal whole-chain solution might be implemented.  
Policy response 
Policy response to market failure in the food marketing chain is linked to the nature of 
private incentives.  Where non-provision1 is interpreted as being socially or ethically 
undesirable, mandatory provision (e.g. salmonella control) is one possible response.  
The mandating authority must choose, perhaps arbitrarily, which stage of the food 
chain will undertake provision. Having made the choice, a further option is to tax one 
or more stages of the food marketing chain to recover administration costs and/or to 
compensate the provider for added costs. 
 
These choices may not yield a least-cost outcome and are likely to generate profits for 
non-providing stages.  Other policy responses include state provision (e.g. food safety 
certification) or subsidisation (e.g. for farmers’ conversion to organic milk produc-
tion), or state-funded promotions to increase consumer willingness to pay (e.g. ge-
neric dairy promotion).  In all cases, the efficiency implications of a policy interven-
tion can be examined by improved knowledge of the incentives for attribute provision 
and the ways in which costs or competitive structures affect them. 
                                                 
1 The symmetric argument (where the attribute is considered socially undesirable) is not considered 
here. 
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1.5. The report 
Purpose 
This report summarises work on developing a model of the food marketing chain that 
examines the economics of food product attribute provision.  From a set of estimates 
of attributes’ price premia and provision costs, the impact of pricing, technologies, 
and policy interventions is examined.  Alternative approaches are taken to the issue of 
optimal provision: “whole chain” vs. “single stage”. 
 
The report identifies situations in which attribute provision appears, disappears, and 
switches from one stage to another in the food marketing chain.  In addition to provi-
sion, profitability is recorded and compared amongst scenarios.  This allows meas-
urement of externalities and prescription of within-chain compensation.  It also allows 
examination of aspects of government-mandated provision.  
Audience 
This report has three audiences.  Food industry firms are invited to examine the model 
for applications to their own attribute provision decisions, their positioning within the 
food chain, and the impacts of food industry policies they encounter.  The second au-
dience is the Danish food policy establishment: this work offers a systematic exami-
nation of food attribute provision under a range of cost, revenue and policy scenarios.  
The third audience is the agricultural economics profession, for whom this report is a 
contribution to understanding of food attribute provision and relationships in the 
modern food chain.  
Structure 
This report has five sections.  Section 2 details the mathematical programming model 
used to examine firms’ attribute provision decisions.  Section 3 describes and explains 
the scenarios examined, and section 4 lists the results.  Section 5 is a discussion of the 
procedure and the results, and the practical extensions and applications of the work. 
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2. Analytical model 
2.1. Approach taken 
In this research, food attribute provision is interpreted as a static optimisation problem 
in the absence of uncertainty over costs and revenues. The incentives discussed above 
are represented by a profit function that includes complexities of revenues and costs 
that reflect competitive and technological features of the food marketing chain.  
Competitive features target the shares available to each stage of the chain of the retail 
price premium that the consumer pays for the attribute.  Technological features ad-
dress economies of scale and scope that are likely to influence costs of provision 
across a range of scenarios.  
 
Provision of attributes is presented as an all-or-nothing event.  This means that attrib-
utes are either endogenously provided in the model, or not, with no intermediate or 
partial provision.  Free-rider incentives are addressed by the model’s allocation of 
costs to just one stage of the chain (the provider) while benefits are shared throughout 
the chain.  For this reason, two objective functions are needed: a “whole chain” opti-
misation that maximises profits to the whole chain; and a “single stage” optimisation 
that maximises the profits of any stage that provides the attribute.  While the whole 
chain internalises free-riding, the single stage model leaves it as an externality that 
may result in under-provision. 
 
The model does not include a component that maximises consumer welfare: consum-
ers’ willingness to pay for attributes is included exogenously.  Social objectives are 
also not included in the objective function, but some scenarios examine the prospect 
of provision of attributes for which costs exceed financial returns in the food market-
ing chain.  
 
Scenarios are constructed to examine the sensitivity of the model to alternative cost 
and revenue specifications, and to identify key impacts of provision that might be 
mandated by policymakers.  Associated with each solution are the list of attributes 
provided, and the stage at which provision occurs.  Profits at all stages of the chain 
are also reported, along with sensitivity analyses that chart the implications of non-
provision.  Comparisons of the whole chain and single stage models allow commen-
tary of the prospects for within-chain compensation (i.e. one agent to another) and 
subsidisation (from outside the chain) to invoke attribute provision. 
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2.2. Conceptual model 
Stages, products and attributes 
A stage s∈S of the food marketing chain delivers volume siky , where i∈I are products 
with k∈K quality attributes.   
Quantities and price premia 
The consumer receives volume Riky , where R∈S is the retail stage.  Price premia 
s
ikp  
apply ∀ i,k and s.  Price premia are allocated amongst stages s according to sikp = 
.s Rik ikpΨ  ∀ s, where 
s
ikΨ is an allocation received at stage s, and 1
s
ik
s
Ψ =∑ .  
s
ikΨ  is 
treated below as exogenously determined, but may be the outcome of bargaining, or 
of other institutional processes not examined further here. 
Costs of provision 
At each stage agents face costs of attribute provision ( , , , )s s s sik ik jk ilc y y yw , where w is 
input prices2 and arguments ands sjk ily y  imply opportunities for economies of scope 
due to cost sub-additivity between products i,j∈I  (“i-form”) and/or attributes k,l∈K  
(“k-form”).     
Profits 
Across all products and attributes, profit for the whole chain is  
 
                . . ( , , , )s R s s s s sik ik ik ik ik jk il
s i k
p y c y y y Π = Ψ − ∑∑∑ w .                              (1) 
 
Note that agents benefit from receiving sikp = .
s R
ik ikpΨ  at every stage s, but (.)
s
ikc  is 
paid by only one stage. 
                                                 
2 Appearance of the argument w does not preclude imperfect competition in input markets, implying 
w(x) for input x. However, it is not considered further here. 
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2.3. Specification of empirical model 
Attribute provision as a variable 
Agents’ choices regarding attribute provision at each stage of the food marketing 
chain employs (1) as a mathematical programming problem with choice variable 
s
ikA such that  
 
{1if quality attribute is present0 otherwisesikA ≡   ∀ i, k and s. 
 
To mobilise a non-linear programming model3 with meaningful dual interpretation, 
s
ikA is not strictly a binomial variable, but rather is specified in the constraint set as  
 
 0 1sikA< ≤ .                                                        (2) 
Maximization ensures that sikA =1 in the case of provision, with multiple-stage provi-
sion precluded by the constraint  
 
 1sik
s
A ≤∑ .                                                         (3) 
Objective function for whole-chain optimisation 
Combining (1), (2) and (3) provides the objective function to maximise whole chain 
profits (WC):  
 
 
( )
.
. 1
max
. 1 .( )
1
s
i k
s R s s
ik ik ik ik
s
s s s s s s s s
ik ik il ik il jk ik jk
s l k j i
s
s s s s s s s s sik
ik ik il ik il jk ik jk ik
s l k j i
s s
ik ik
s
p A y
FC A A A A A
WC
A
AVC A A A A A y
A
ρ
λ
≠ ≠
≠ ≠
 Ψ


  − − ϒ − ϒ      =
    
− − Λ − Λ   
      

+ −

∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
i k











∑∑ (4) 
                                                 
3 The model was specified in GAMS 2.50C (GAMS Development Corporation), and run in the 
Windows NT environment accessing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  The Data exchange between 
GAMS and Microsoft Excel used the downloadable macro XLS2GMS version 1.6 (Kalvelagen, 
2002). 
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The first RHS expression in (4) is whole-chain revenue, the second is fixed costs of 
attribute provision, and the third is variable costs of attribute provision.  Economies of 
scope are available from provision of multiple k (k and l, k≠ l) and from multiple i (i 
and j, i≠ j).  Cost sub-additivities in fixed costs are denoted ϒ  and in variable costs 
Λ , expressed as a % saving in costs resulting from multiple attributes and/or multiple 
products.  Economies of scale are modelled by parameter 0 < sikρ ≤ 1.   
 
Note that in (4) whole-chain revenue is activated by the attribute provision sikA at any 
stage (via    =1), but costs of attribute provision accrue only to the stage at 
which provision occurs (via sikA =1).  This means that so long as overall net benefits to 
the food marketing chain are positive, then the attribute will be provided in the solu-
tion.  A possible outcome is that provision will be unprofitable for the providing 
stage, but profitable for the chain as a whole.  Losses to the provider (and to other 
non-providing stages) are measurable, and represent a lower bound for potential com-
pensation from stages that benefit from provision.  
Dual variables for whole-chain scenarios 
At the optimum, LaGrangian multipliers sikλ  provide valuations of attributes for 
which sikA  = 0.  In that context, 
s
ikλ < 0 implies a “provision threshold” for levels of 
profitability at each stage, so that | sikλ | = the loss to the entire food marketing chain 
from provision at stage s of sikA  ∀ i and k.  Alternatively, |
s
ikλ | = the subsidy neces-
sary to induce provision at stage s.  In each solution, as conditions approach those fa-
vourable for attribute provision at any s, sikλ →  0 from below. 
Objective function for single-stage optimisation 
A different revenue specification yields an alternative objective function in (5). Provi-
sion ( sikA  = 1) focuses on revenue accruing only to the stage at which the attribute is 
provided.  This objective function allocates attribute provision to the most profitable 
stage, but unlike (4) only the profits at the provision stage (ST) are maximised.  In 
this case, revenue accruing to non-providing stages is a positive externality.  Whole 
chain revenue and profit is still able to be measured from post-solution optimisation.  
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Dual variables for single-stage scenarios 
LaGrangian multipliers from 0 0s sik ikAυ < ∀ =  are interpreted as the loss to the indi-
vidual stage from provision.  In general, s sik ikυ λ≠ , because 
s
ikυ  measures the poten-
tial impact of stage s’s provision on stage s profits, whereas sikλ  in (4) measures the 
potential impact of stage s’s provision on whole chain profits.  The relationship be-
tween the two LaGrangian multipliers offers insight into incentives within the food 
marketing chain. 
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3. Empirical implementation 
3.1. Dimensions 
A 3-stage food marketing chain is modelled, s∈{Retail, Processing, Farm}.  The 
products i selected reflect their importance in the Danish food marketing chain 
i∈{Pork, Chicken, Eggs, Milk, Beef}.  Attributes k selected reflect current policy 
and commercial developments and concerns in Denmark k∈{Organic, Bacteria free, 
Identity preservation, Animal welfare}.   
3.2. Data 
A set of indicative Danish cost and revenue data was assembled from several sources.  
Substantial simplification and aggregation within commodity sectors was used to 
compile and calibrate the data.  A set of enterprise budgets was assembled for the 
farm production, processing and retail sale of each of the i products.  The volumes 
used in the budgeting procedure were maintained.  All monetary values are expressed 
in Danish kroner (DKK). 
 
The budgets were subdivided as far as possible into constituent parts (e.g. sales of 
products and by-products, fuel and labour costs, etc).  Fixed and variable components 
of costs were maintained separately to allow more targeted estimation of the impacts 
of provision on costs.  For each attribute k, estimated impacts on costs for each prod-
uct i were applied to relevant cost components.  These are expressed as % increases in 
each of variable and costs.  Retail price premia are derived from observed data, ad-
justed for by-product volumes and other factors such as rejections due to quality grad-
ing or inspection.  Estimates of shares of price premia passed on by retailers are 
drawn from observed price patterns.  Specification of scale and scope characteristics 
in cost functions drew on available research and the author’s estimates. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the data used in derivation of fixed and variable costs, and retail 
price premia.  In these tables the logic flows from the left column (existing costs of 
production and existing retail prices) through the middle columns (% premia applied) 
to the right hand columns (derived premia used in the model specification). 
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3.3. Scenarios 
Whole chain vs single stage 
For every scenario, paired runs are used to compare solutions from objective func-
tions (4) and (5).  For each scenario, the notation “WC” is used to denote the whole 
chain model, and “ST” the single stage model. 
Technology specifications 
Scenarios 1-6 feature combinations of silϒ ,
s
jkϒ , 
s
ilΛ , 
s
jkΛ  and 
s
ikρ  to examine the 
impacts of the various forms of economies of scope, and of scale.  Scenario 1 is used 
as a baseline against scenarios 2-6. 
 
Figure 3.1.  Scenarios examining technology specifications 
 
 
 
 Scenario 1 
•No scale 
economies (ρ=1), 
•No scope 
economies 
(Λ=Υ=0), 
•Ψ at 
35% (retail),  
30% (processor), 
35% (farm) 
Scenario 2
•No scale economies 
•Scope economies 
between attributes only 
•Ψ at 35%, 30%, 35%
Scenario 3
•No scale economies, 
•Scope economies 
between products only, 
•Ψ at 35%, 30%, 35% 
Scenario 4
•ρ at  0.80 (retail),  
0.70 (processing), 
1.0 (farm) 
•No scope economies 
•Ψ at 35%, 30%, 35% 
Scenario 5
• No scale economies 
•Both forms of scope 
economy 
•Ψ at 35%, 30%, 35% 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-1 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-1 
Scenario 6 
• ρ at  0.80 (retail),  
0.70 (processing), 
1.0 (farm) 
•Both forms of scope 
economy 
•Ψ at 35%, 30%, 35% 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-2 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-2 
WHOLE 
CHAIN 
 WC-3 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-3 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-4 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-4 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-5 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-5 WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-6 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-6 
  
 Provision of quality attributes in the food marketing chain, FØI 27
Price premium specifications 
A range of specifications of sikΨ  is used to provide scenarios where the 3 stages of 
the food marketing chain receive different shares of the price premium Rikp .  Scenario 
6 is used as a baseline against scenarios 7-9. 
 
Figure 3.2. Scenarios examining price premium specifications 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 8
•Setting as for 
Scenario 6 
•Ψ at  
20%,  
60%,  
20% 
Scenario 7
•Setting as for 
Scenario 6 
•Ψ at  
60%,  
20%,  
20% 
Scenario 9 
•Setting as for 
Scenario 6 
•Ψ at 
20%,  
20%,  
60% 
Scenario 6 
 ρ at  0.80, 0.70, 1.0
Both forms of scope 
economy 
•Ψ at  
35% (retail), 
30% (processing), 
35% (farm) 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-6 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-6 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-7 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-7 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-8 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-8 
WHOLE 
CHAIN  
WC-9 
SINGLE 
STAGE 
ST-9 
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Mandatory attribute provision 
Mandatory provision of an attribute is enforced by exogenous specification of sikA =1  
for the stage, product and attribute in question.  The attribute “bacteria free” for eggs 
was chosen as an example because it was not featured in any solution investigated 
during the model runs.  The processor stage was arbitrarily chosen as the mandated 
provider of the attribute.  Scenario 6 is used as a baseline against scenario 10. 
 
Figure 3.3. Scenarios examining mandatory attribute provision 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 10
Settings as for  
Scenario 6 
Mandatory attribute 
provision at processing 
stage 
Scenario 6
 ρ at  0.80, 0.70, 1.0 
Both forms of scope economy 
•Ψ at  
35% (retail), 
30% (processing), 
35% (farm) 
WHOLE CHAIN
WC-6 
SINGLE STAGE 
ST-6 
WHOLE CHAIN
WC-10 
SINGLE STAGE 
ST-10 
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4. Results 
4.1. Response to changes in technology specifications 
Attribute provision 
Introduction to the model of scale and scope economies (scenarios 1-6) increases the 
number of attributes provided, and increases the profits accruing to the entire food 
marketing chain.  This result holds for both the whole chain model and the single-
stage model, and in both cases the impacts of scope are far greater than those of scale. 
 
With no economies of scale and scope the whole chain model (scenario WC-1) deliv-
ers 14 attributes: 6 at processing stage; 8 at farm stage; and none at retail stage (table 
4.1).  In contrast, the single stage model delivers only 6 attributes: 2 at processing 
stage and 4 at farm stage (table 4.2).  This difference reflects the internalisation of the 
incentives for provision: the whole chain model delivers attributes so long as total 
chain profitability is increased; the single stage model only where it is profitable for 
the providing stage to do so.  The attributes provided in the whole chain model, al-
though not in the single stage model, can result in losses to the providing stage.  
Those losses are offset by profits at other stages (the process of internalisation), and 
the re-allocation of the remaining chain profits allow for potential compensation 
within the chain.  The extent and practical implementation of this compensation is ad-
dressed further below.  
 
In the whole chain model (table 4.1) economies of scope deliver an additional 2 at-
tributes, (scenario WC-2 and scenario WC-3) over the baseline scenario (WC-1).  
However, the two different forms of economies of scope deliver the new attributes at 
different stages: economies of scope between attributes  (scenario WC-2) delivers two 
new attributes for chicken (organic and animal welfare) at farm stage and identity 
preservation in beef at processing stage (a switch from farm provision to processor 
provision where it accompanies identity preservation by processors for other meats).  
Economies of scope between attributes raise chain profits by 22% (from 62.531 to 
76.648).  Economies of scope between products (scenario WC-3) raises chain profits 
only 10%, and sees identity preservation in beef revert to farm stage. 
 
In the single stage model (table 4.2), economies of scope have a more profound ef-
fect, and the two forms of economies of scope (scenario ST-2 vs. scenario ST-3) yield 
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markedly different provision outcomes.  Economies of scope between attributes (sce-
nario ST-2) delivers 3 new attributes: farm provision of organic pork and organic 
beef, and processor provision of identity-preserved chicken.  In contrast to the whole 
chain model, identity preservation for beef remains at farm stage when economies of 
scope between attributes are introduced.  Economies of scope between products in the 
single stage model (scenario ST-3) results in organic milk and organic beef being 
provided together at farm stage, and bacteria-free beef is provided at farm stage to ac-
company (table 4.2).  Bacteria-free beef is expected to be more expensive to provide 
where beef is also produced with animal welfare and organic attributes, implying a 
negative impact of economies of scope between attributes: hence its appearance in the 
single-stage model only in scenario ST-3, which features only economies of scope be-
tween products. 
 
In the single-stage model, no provision switches occur between stages due to econo-
mies of scope.  Economies of scope raise chain profits by 83% (scenario ST-2, 
economies of scope between attributes) and 53% (scenario ST-3, economies of scope 
between products).  Notably, economies of scope between products (scenario ST-3) 
delivers more attributes but is significantly less profitable than economies of scope 
between attributes (scenario ST-2). 
 
Economies of scale have quite different impacts on the whole chain model (table 4.1, 
WC-4) than on the single stage model (table 4.2, ST-4).  In the whole chain model, no 
additional attributes are provided over scenario 1, there is no change in the stage at 
which provision occurs, and profits rise very slightly.  In the single stage model, iden-
tity preserved chicken is introduced at the processing stage, but no switching of provi-
sion between stages occurs.  Chain profits rise from 35.129 to 39.875 (an increase of 
13%).   
 
The introduction of both forms of economies of scope simultaneously (scenario 5) 
yields 16 attributes in the whole chain model, the same as each of the forms of 
economies of scope individually (WC-2 and WC-3), and increases profits 37% over 
scenario WC-1.  In the single stage model, scenario ST-5 delivers 11 attributes, more 
than in either of ST-2 and ST-3, and the stage-configuration of provision is quite dif-
ferent to that in scenarios ST-1 to ST-4.  Moreover, in the single stage model access 
to both forms of economies of scope (ST-4) almost doubles chain profits (from 
35.129 to 70.001), compared with a 37% increase in the whole chain model.  For both 
models, the simultaneous introduction of economies of scale with economies of scope 
(WC-6 and ST-6) does not alter the provision pattern from those in scenario 5. 
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Table 4.1.   Whole chain model: response to changes in technology specification 
 
  WC-1  WC-2  WC-3  WC-4  WC-5  WC-6 
Chain profits 62.531 76.648 69.065 62.802 85.753 86.046 
Attribute provision 14 16 16 14 16 16 
Retail provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Processing provision 6 7 6 6 7 7 
Farm provision 8 9 10 8 9 9 
ORG-PORK* F F F F F F 
ORG-CHKN  F F  F F 
ORG-EGGS       
ORG-MILK F F F F F F 
ORG-BEEF F F F F F F 
BA-FREE-PORK W W W W W W 
BA-FREE-CHKN W W W W W W 
BA-FREE-EGGS       
BA-FREE-MILK W W W W W W 
BA-FREE-BEEF W W W W W W 
I-PRES-PORK W W W W W W 
I-PRES-CHKN W W W W W W 
I-PRES-EGGS       
I-PRES-MILK       
I-PRES-BEEF F W F F W W 
AN-WF-PORK F F F F F F 
AN-WF-CHKN  F F  F F 
AN-WF-EGGS F F F F F F 
AN-WF-MILK F F F F F F 
AN-WF-BEEF F F F F F F 
 
* ”F” = attribute provided at Farm stage; ”W” at Processing stage; “R” at Retail stage 
 
 
Table 4.2.  Single stage model: response to changes in technology specification 
 
  ST-1  ST-2  ST-3  ST-4  ST-5  ST-6 
       
Chain profits 35.129 64.417 55.091 39.875 70.001 70.070 
Attribute provision 6 9 10 7 11 11 
Retail provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Processing provision 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Farm provision 4 6 7 4 8 8 
ORG-PORK  F   F F 
ORG-CHKN       
ORG-EGGS       
ORG-MILK   F  F F 
ORG-BEEF   F F   F F 
BA-FREE-PORK W W W W W W 
BA-FREE-CHKN W W W W W W 
BA-FREE-EGGS       
BA-FREE-MILK       
BA-FREE-BEEF     F       
I-PRES-PORK F F F F F F 
I-PRES-CHKN  W W W W W 
I-PRES-EGGS       
I-PRES-MILK       
I-PRES-BEEF F F F F F F 
AN-WF-PORK F F F F F F 
AN-WF-CHKN       
AN-WF-EGGS       
AN-WF-MILK     F F 
AN-WF-BEEF F F F F F F 
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Distribution of chain profits 
The distribution of profits arising from technology-related scenarios is presented in 
figure 4.1.  In the whole chain model (WC-1 to WC-6 in figure 4.1), retailers retain a 
significant share of chain profits under all scenarios, while farm and processors’ 
shares of profits fluctuate.  In the single stage model (ST in figure 4.1), the shares of 
profits are much more consistent across scenarios.  This difference arises because in 
the single stage model no firms make losses, so provision in response to economies of 
scope adds to profits from provision of both old and new attributes.   
 
In the whole chain model, losses from provision at one stage can be added to by fur-
ther provision, so long as aggregate chain profits rise in the process.   Scenarios that 
add attributes (WC-3 compared to WC-1 and WC-2) may involve burdening one 
stage (in this case the farm stage) with increasing losses.  However, for non-providing 
stages profits always rise with provision by other stages, resulting in a rise in the 
share of chain profits accruing to non-providing stages.  This demonstrates the free-
riding incentives discussed above.  
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of chain profits: response to technology specification 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
W
C
-1
W
C
-2
W
C
-3
W
C
-4
W
C
-5
W
C
-6
ST
-1
ST
-2
ST
-3
ST
-4
ST
-5
ST
-6
C
ha
in
 p
ro
fit
s 
(D
KK
)
Farm Processor Retail
  
 Provision of quality attributes in the food marketing chain, FØI 33
4.2. Response to change in price premium specifications 
Attribute provision 
In the whole chain model, re-specification of the allocation of shares of price premia 
amongst stages of the food marketing chain leaves attribute provision unaffected, at 
16 attributes, of which 7 at processing stage and 9 at farm stage (table 4.3). 
 
In contrast, the single stage model’s pattern of attribute provision (see table 4.4) is 
highly sensitive to the allocation of price premium.  Scenario ST-7 (where 60% of the 
price premium is retained at the retail stage) features provision of one attribute at re-
tail stage, 2 at processing and 5 at farm stage, for a total of 8.   Scenario ST-8 (60% of 
price premium to the processor) is dominated by the processing stage (7 of 11 attrib-
utes provided).  Scenario ST-9 (60% of premium to the farm stage) features 13 of a 
total 14 attributes being provided at farm stage.  
 
These results further demonstrate the divergent incentives in the two models of chain 
behaviour.  Clearly, internalising the free-rider effects (using the whole chain model) 
generates the larger number of attributes, but a real-world outcome of this type re-
quires substantial compensation to providing stages from other stages.  Putting those 
compensation mechanisms in place first (i.e. by re-aligning shares of price premia in 
the single stage model) clearly encourages provision, but that provision occurs only at 
stages that have access to the price premia.  Clearly, ex post compensation has the ca-
pacity deliver more attributes and higher chain profits that does ex ante specification 
of incentives.  However, firms providing attributes need to be assured of receiving the 
compensation, in appropriate amounts, before provision can occur.   
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Table 4.3.  Whole chain model: response to changes in shares of price premium 
     
 WC-6 WC-7 WC-8 WC-9 
     
Chain profits 86.046 74.340 80.426 101.497 
No. Atts 16 16 16 16 
Retail provision 0 0 0 0 
Processing provision 7 7 7 7 
Farm provision 9 9 9 9 
ORG-PORK F F F F 
ORG-CHKN F F F F 
ORG-EGGS     
ORG-MILK F F F F 
ORG-BEEF F F F F 
BA-FREE-PORK W W W W 
BA-FREE-CHKN W W W W 
BA-FREE-EGGS     
BA-FREE-MILK W W W W 
BA-FREE-BEEF W W W W 
I-PRES-PORK W W W W 
I-PRES-CHKN W W W W 
I-PRES-EGGS     
I-PRES-MILK     
I-PRES-BEEF W W W W 
AN-WF-PORK F F F F 
AN-WF-CHKN F F F F 
AN-WF-EGGS F F F F 
AN-WF-MILK F F F F 
AN-WF-BEEF F F F F 
 
 
 
Table 4.4.  Single stage model: response to changes in shares of price premium 
     
 ST-6 ST-7 ST-8 ST-9 
     
Chain profits 70.070 44.650 59.650 90.057 
No. Atts 11 8 11 14 
Retail provision 0 1 0 0 
Processing provision 3 2 7 1 
Farm provision 8 5 4 13 
ORG-PORK F   F 
ORG-CHKN    F 
ORG-EGGS     
ORG-MILK F   F 
ORG-BEEF F F F F 
BA-FREE-PORK W W W W 
BA-FREE-CHKN W  W  
BA-FREE-EGGS     
BA-FREE-MILK   W  
BA-FREE-BEEF     W F 
I-PRES-PORK F W W F 
I-PRES-CHKN W R W F 
I-PRES-EGGS     
I-PRES-MILK     
I-PRES-BEEF F F W F 
AN-WF-PORK F F F F 
AN-WF-CHKN    F 
AN-WF-EGGS    F 
AN-WF-MILK F F F F 
AN-WF-BEEF F F F F 
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Distribution of chain profits 
In the whole chain model, the distribution of chain profits follows the allocation of 
price premia in the chain.  This means that (see figure 4.2) WC-7 features the major-
ity of profits accruing to retailers, in WC-8 the majority accrues to processors, and in 
WC-9 it goes to farmers.  Notably, WC-7 and WC-8 feature negative profits at the 
farm stage, despite farmers’ participation in attribute provision.  
 
In the single stage model (ST-6-ST-9 in figure 4.2), the shares of profits accruing to 
each stage are far more stable: the major share of profits still accrues to the stage with 
the major share of price premia, but no stage suffers negative profits.  In the single 
stage model, the share of profits accruing to each stage is more closely aligned with 
the share of provision than with the share of price premium: stages will provide at-
tributes only if they get paid to do so.  
 
Figure 4.2. Distribution of chain profits: response to price premium allocation 
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4.3. Response to mandatory provision 
Attribute provision 
In the scenario where provision is mandated (WC-10 and ST-10), both models deliver 
reduced profits with no change in configuration of provision amongst stages in com-
parison with scenario 6 (table 4.5), aside from the provision of bacteria-free eggs at 
the processing stage.     
 
Table 4.5.  Response to mandatory processor provision of bacteria free eggs 
      
 WC-6 WC-10  ST-6 ST-10 
      
Chain profits 86.046 77.144  70.070 61.168 
Attribute provision 16 17  11 12 
Retail provision 0 0  0 0 
Processing provision 7 8  3 4 
Farm provision 9 9  8 8 
ORG-PORK F F  F F 
ORG-CHKN F F    
ORG-EGGS      
ORG-MILK F F  F F 
ORG-BEEF F F  F F 
BA-FREE-PORK W W  W W 
BA-FREE-CHKN W W  W W 
BA-FREE-EGGS*  W   W 
BA-FREE-MILK W W    
BA-FREE-BEEF W W      
I-PRES-PORK W W  F F 
I-PRES-CHKN W W  W W 
I-PRES-EGGS      
I-PRES-MILK      
I-PRES-BEEF W W  F F 
AN-WF-PORK F F  F F 
AN-WF-CHKN F F    
AN-WF-EGGS F F    
AN-WF-MILK F F  F F 
AN-WF-BEEF F F  F F 
 
*BOLD figures indicate mandatory provision 
 
 
 
Distribution of chain profits 
In both models, mandatory provision reduces profits at the providing stage (in this 
case, processing), and raises profits at the other two stages (figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of chain profits: response to mandatory provision 
 
4.4. Examples of dual variable values 
Explanatory note 
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ikυ  address attributes that are not 
provided.  They measure the loss that would be incurred at each stage of the food 
marketing chain if the attribute had been provided by firms at that stage in each 
scenario.  Recall that sikλ  and 
s
ikυ  refer to the whole chain and single stage models, 
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In the event that a particular product attribute is considered socially desirable, but is 
not provided by firms in response to market incentives, then the absolute value of the 
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Provision of bacteria-free beef at farm and processing stages 
The single stage values ,
FARM
BEEF BA FREEυ −  and ,
PROCESSOR
BEEF BA FREEυ −  for ST-1 to ST-9 are 
shown in figure 4.4.  Note that in ST-1 to ST-6, the values of the LaGrangian multi-
plier at each stage vary considerably, and their relative magnitudes at farm and proc-
essing stage reverse themselves several times.  In ST-8 the attribute is provided by 
processors, and in ST-9 by farmers, so no corresponding values for ,
FARM
BEEF BA FREEυ −  
and ,
PROCESSOR
BEEF BA FREEυ −  are shown in figure 4.4. 
 
These results suggest that (i) provision of bacteria-free beef will not occur unless the 
share of retail price premium substantially favours the providing stage (see ST-7, ST-
8 and ST-9), and (ii) that the stage at which provision is at lowest cost can depend on 
the availability of economies of scale and scope (ST-1 to ST-6). 
 
Figure 4.4. LaGrangian multiplier values for bacteria-free beef products 
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apply, and economies of scale are available, the cheapest subsidy would be targeted at 
the processor. 
Provision of organic attributes at farm stage for beef and/or milk products 
For practical reasons, provision of organic product attributes is likely to be confined 
to the farm stage.  Organic milk and organic beef are provided in scenarios 3, 6 and 9 
(which is why figure 4.5 does not display a value for those scenarios).  The model re-
sults suggest that economies of scope between products (ST-3 and ST-6), and favour-
able shares of price premium at farm level (ST-9) favour organic beef and milk pro-
duction at farm level. 
 
Figure 4.5. LaGrangian multiplier values for organic milk and beef at farm level 
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Where the farm stage’s share of the retail price premium for organic milk and organic 
beef is only 20% (scenarios 7 and 8), the results indicate that organic beef would be 
provided, but a subsidy of about 0.08 DKK/kg of milk would be necessary for organic 
milk to be provided as well.  Where the farm stage receives 60% of the retail price 
premium, both organic milk and organic beef are provided at farm stage.  
Non-provision of bacteria-free eggs 
In the scenarios investigated using both models, bacteria-free eggs is one of the prod-
uct attributes not provided in model output.  This is a consequence of the data used: 
sufficient incentives for provision (at any stage) do not exist.  Table 4.6 presents se-
lected values for sikυ  and 
s
ikλ from scenarios associated with technologies employed 
(scenario 1) and the allocation of price premium amongst stages (scenarios 6-9). 
 
Table 4.6.  Lagrangian multiplier values for provision of bacteria-free eggs 
   
 Single stage model (ST) Whole chain model (WC) 
 ,
PROCESSOR
EGGS BA FREEυ −  ,
FARM
EGGS BA FREEυ −  ,
PROCESSOR
EGGS BA FREEλ −  ,
FARM
EGGS BA FREEλ −  
     
 DKK/kg 
scenario 1 -12.31 -5.74 -10.39 -3.94 
scenario 6 -10.82 -7.61 -8.90 -5.84 
scenario 7 -11.09 -8.02 -8.92 -5.86 
scenario 8 -10.00 -8.02 -8.91 -5.85 
scenario 9 -11.09 -6.91 -8.88 -5.82  
 
 
Results from both models indicate that it is always more expensive for the processing 
stage to provide bacteria-free eggs than it is for the farm stage.  An alternative inter-
pretation is that if a subsidy were to be paid, it would always be cheaper to subsidise 
the farm stage than the processing stage. 
 
The magnitude of the single stage model’s values ( sikυ ) are always higher than the 
whole chain model’s ( sikλ ) because the whole chain model takes into account benefits 
at non-providing stages.  Should a mandating authority consider taxation of one or 
more stages of the marketing chain in order to redistribute benefits arising from man-
datory provision, then the amount of the tax is correctly measured by sikλ <
s
ikυ  ∀ s.  In 
a practical sense, the stages of the food marketing chain would then need to collabo-
rate on the form and mechanism of redistribution. 
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The reported increase in the magnitude of the farm stage LaGrangian multiplier be-
tween scenario 1 and scenario 6 (columns 2 and 4 of table 4.4) reflect the impacts of 
economies (or in this case, diseconomies) of scope: provision of bacteria-free eggs at 
farm stage is more expensive where organic or animal welfare attributes are also to be 
provided in egg production.  Notably, the opposite effect is observed at processing 
stage (columns 1 and 3): industrial processes can be expected to offer synergies for 
diversified lines of processed product, allowing a cost saving between scenarios 1 and 
6.  These results show that the identification of the least-cost provider and the sources 
of compensatory taxes will be different in different technological and provision situa-
tions.   
4.5. Compensation between stages 
Explanatory note 
The whole chain model delivers attributes in circumstances where, at the margin, 
whole-chain revenues exceed whole-chain costs.  Unlike in the single stage model, 
provision in the whole chain model can occur despite a loss accruing to the providing 
stage.  Calculations on the endogenous variables allow identification of those losses, 
and of the potential for compensation amongst stages of the food marketing chain. 
Examination of the provision of organic chicken 
Table 4.7 presents the profits calculated from scenario WC-6.  Losses (shown in 
bold) can be identified at the processing stage (0.02 DKK for bacteria-free milk and 
0.08 DKK for bacteria-free beef), and at farm stage (5.03 DKK for organic chicken, 
1.40 DKK for animal welfare attributes for chicken and 0.65 DKK for animal welfare 
attributes for eggs. 
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Table 4.7.  Scenario WC-6: Table of profits by stage, product and attribute 
  
 Attribute 
Stage. product ORG BA-FREE I-PRESS AN-WF 
     
 DKK 
Ret. Pork 5.25 2.52 2.10 3.15 
Ret. Chicken 5.25 1.75 1.75 2.63 
Ret. Eggs    1.31 
Ret. Milk 0.48 0.28  0.17 
Ret. Beef 3.15 1.40 1.75 2.10 
Proc. Pork 5.00 0.86 1.32 3.00 
Proc. Chicken 4.74 0.40 0.44 2.37 
Proc. Eggs   1.14 
Proc. Milk 0.41 -0.02  0.14 
Proc. Beef 3.75 -0.08 1.32 2.50 
Farm. Pork 2.06 4.20 3.50 2.40 
Farm. Chicken -5.03 2.92 2.92 -1.40 
Farm. Eggs   -0.65 
Farm. Milk 0.13 0.28  0.09 
Farm. Beef 2.90 2.64 3.30 3.48  
 
 
Using organic chicken as an example, the sum of retail profits (5.25 DKK) and proc-
essing profits (4.74 DKK) is 9.99 DKK.  If compensation were paid to the farm stage 
(which loses 5.03 DKK) by the other two stages, a surplus of 4.96 DKK is still avail-
able to be divided between one, two, or three stages.  The form that compensation 
might take is not pursued further here, but obviously might appear as a higher share of 
price premia or as one or more shared cost items, enabled by communication of costs, 
benefits and other information amongst stages.  
 
Table 4.8 presents model output for other scenarios concerning provision of organic 
chicken.  In WC-6 (described above) the allocation of retail price premium is 30%, 
35%, 30% to each of retail, processing and farm stages.  In WC-7 and WC-8, those 
shares are skewed in favour of the retail and processing stages, respectively.  Table 
4.8 presents the differential profit levels achieved by those two stages, and the loss in-
curred at farm stage (8.78 DKK in both cases).   
 
The bottom row of table 4.8 measures the surplus left over after compensation of the 
farm stage for unprofitable provision.  Notably, the surplus is much higher in the case 
of equitable premium shares (4.96 DKK in WC-6) than in either of the cases where 
premium shares greatly favour non-providing stages (3.38 and 3.70 DKK).  
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Table 4.8.  Organic chicken: compensation under conditions of changed allocation 
of price premium 
    
  WC-6 WC-7 WC-8 
    
 DKK 
Ret. Chicken 5.25 9.00 3.00 
Proc. Chicken 4.74 3.16 9.47 
Farm. Chicken -5.03 -8.78 -8.78 
Surplus after compensation 4.96 3.38 3.70  
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Overview 
Provision of quality attributes offers incentives for Danish food industry firms to co-
ordinate up and down the food marketing chain.  Such co-ordination also offers op-
portunities for greater efficiency in public policies and enhanced public-private part-
nership.  To some extent these improvements have been demonstrated in the case of 
Salmonella in the Danish pork, chicken and shell eggs sectors.  This paper proposes a 
new method of quantifying the costs and benefits of alternative provision and funding 
mechanisms, when provision of food safety is integrated with other provision activi-
ties and is placed in the context of price manipulation through market power. 
 
Beyond food safety, three other attributes (organics, trace-ability and animal welfare) 
of current interest in Denmark are examined here.  Patterns of provision within the 
chain are seen to be deeply affected by changes in incentives at each stage and for the 
whole chain, and result in large changes in the size and allocation of chain profits 
from provision. 
 
A mathematical programming model is used to examine provision of quality attrib-
utes in the Danish food marketing chain.  Impacts of alternative provision technolo-
gies are examined, as are implications of reallocations of shares of retail price pre-
mium for each product attribute.  Data used in the model are indicative estimates of 
costs, cost interactions, and price premia. 
 
In recognition of the potential for externality and free-riding in the food marketing 
chain, two forms of the model are used: 
 
• a “single stage” model in which firms at individual stages of the food market-
ing chain make attribute provision decisions on the basis of profitability at 
their own stage; and 
• a “whole chain” model in which maximising profits in the entire food mar-
keting chain is the objective, with provision allocated to the lowest cost pro-
vider. 
 
All scenarios featured paired runs of the model: the whole chain and the single stage 
approaches described above.  Results obtained from the model include provision, 
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profitability and derived dual variables (LaGrangian multipliers).  These are able to 
be interpreted in terms of potential subsidization from government and between-stage 
compensation by agents in the food marketing chain. 
5.2. Main results 
Technological specifications 
The whole chain model provides a larger number of attributes than does the single 
stage model, in all scenarios investigated.  This is because the whole chain model 
fully internalises all the externalities and potential transfer payments within the food 
marketing chain. 
 
In both models, attribute provision increases as cost advantages are introduced.  This 
effect is more pronounced in the single stage model, because cost re-specifications di-
rectly affect incentives for providing stages.  Economies of scale and scope are exam-
ined in some depth.  At the farm stage, economies of scope are more likely to occur 
between products (e.g. organic production of both beef and milk) than between attrib-
utes (e.g. beef that is both bacteria-free and produced organically).  However, at the 
processing stage the reverse may be true: diversified lines of the same product may be 
more profitable than provision of the same attribute across a whole range of products.   
 
These effects are demonstrated in the model: the single stage model is particularly 
sensitive to the form of economies of scope: presented here as being between attrib-
utes (k-form) or between products (i-form).  The single stage model delivers more at-
tributes in the presence of i-form economies of scope than it does with k-form econo-
mies of scope.  However, profits are higher with k-form economies of scope.  With 
both forms of economies of scope, the single stage model provides still more attrib-
utes, and profits increase over the baseline scenario. 
 
The whole chain model delivers the same number of attributes regardless of the form 
of economies of scope.  The k-form and i-form scenarios deliver different allocations 
of provision amongst stages, because the cheapest provider is always selected by the 
whole chain model.  Profits are higher with i-form economies of scope, but the differ-
ences are much less than is the case in the single stage model. 
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The impact of technological specification on the distribution of profits in the food 
marketing chain is also different between the two models.  The whole chain model 
(which features higher chain profits) delivers outcomes where the stages providing 
the attributes receive a low proportion of chain profits.  Conversely, in the single 
stage model the stages providing the attributes retain a significant share of chain prof-
its. 
Allocation of price premia 
In the whole chain model, provision of attributes is insensitive to the allocation of the 
retail price premium amongst stages.  Chain profits, however, behave in a complex 
manner in the whole chain model as premium shares are re-specified.  Chain profits 
are maximised when the farm stage receives the highest share of price premiums: this 
is because costs of provision are able to be offset by increased revenues while the re-
tail and processing stages have fewer opportunities for provision.  Allocation of large 
shares of price premium to retail and processing stages results in losses at the farm 
stage, which form the basis for compensation mechanisms (see below). 
 
In the single stage model, the number of attributes provided, and the stages at which 
provision occurs, are highly sensitive to the shares of price premia allocated to the 
three stages.  Skewing of the share of price premia in favour of the providing stages 
(processing and farm) increases the number of attributes provided and increases chain 
profits.  In addition, the pattern of provision in the single stage model is extremely 
sensitive to premium allocation, delivering attributes at retail and processing stages in 
scenarios where those stages respectively receive high shares of the retail price pre-
mium.  Allocation of 60% of the price premium to the farm stage results in 13 of 14 
attributes being provided at farm stage.  Overall, the single stage model allows for a 
more equitable distribution of chain profits from any given scenario, than does the 
whole chain model.  
5.3. Commercial implications 
Discrepancy between whole chain and single stage models 
Neither model presented here is a complete and true interpretation of incentives in the 
food marketing chain.  In any multiple-stage food marketing chain without full verti-
cal integration the whole chain model is unlikely to apply, and attribute provision is 
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likely to follow the single stage model.  On the other hand, in any case where provi-
sion occurs it generates externalities that are fully captured only by the whole chain 
model. 
 
The key commercial question is whether the whole chain model’s outcomes can be 
mimicked by the single stage model in the context of communication and incentive 
mechanisms amongst stages.  The key policy question is what role government might 
play to bring about the whole-chain outcome in the case where it is socially desirable.  
Key results concerning profitability 
The results presented here reflect the principle that chain profits are increased by pro-
vision at the lowest-cost stage of the food marketing chain.  Moreover, profits and 
provision are increased further in scenarios where price premia are allocated towards 
the stages providing the attributes.  These two outcomes reinforce the result achieved 
elsewhere, that chain profits can be increased by improved information-sharing within 
the food chain.  In particular, the sharing of information about costs of provision and 
the sizes and shares of price premia, can increase chain profits. 
 
Because of the apparent influence of economies of scale and scope on the costs of at-
tribute provision, information sharing would ideally feature data on a broad spectrum 
of products and product groups, and the identification of synergies (and non-
synergies) that may lower (or raise) costs at each stage of the food marketing chain. 
 
Examples presented here demonstrate that the lowest-cost stage for provision can 
change with the change in technology (e.g. provision of bacteria-free beef switches 
between stages), and that combinations of products offer significant cost reductions 
(e.g. organic milk and beef at farm stage) as well as cost increases (e.g. bacteria-free 
eggs at farm level).  Notably, results indicate that bacteria-free eggs are cheaper to 
provide in combination with other attributes and products at processing stage, but 
more expensive at farm stage. 
Compensation between stages 
The results from the whole chain model indicate that there is significant scope for 
compensation of providing stages by other stages of the food marketing chain.  A no-
table result is that the available net surplus (after compensation has been paid) is 
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higher in scenarios with an equitable allocation of price premia, than in scenarios 
where the price premium is largely retained by retailers or processors. 
 
The example of organic chicken is presented in some detail.  The single stage model 
does not deliver this product attribute, but the whole chain model does so at an appar-
ent loss to farmers providing the attribute.  A reduction in the retail share of the price 
premium results in a post-compensation gain to the retailer, provided that the stages 
of the food marketing chain can successfully negotiate and implement compensation 
mechanisms.  
Funding and allocation of taxes 
Where an industry funds its own attribute provision (voluntarily or subject to a man-
date), the whole chain model appropriately identifies costs to the entire chain, which 
is equivalent to a tax on the industry.  Efficient re-allocation of self-imposed taxes 
(i.e. industry levies) would be guided by the model’s outcomes. 
 
This provides industry with insight into costs and benefits of alternative courses of ac-
tion when faced with the possibility of mandatory provision.  Bacteria-free eggs are 
taken as an example, where the model’s dual variables identify costs both to the 
whole chain and to individual stages.  These values can be directly compared to exist-
ing and proposed levies and other forms of taxation.  
5.4. Policy implications 
Mandatory provision 
The model results show that the costs of mandatory provision are borne by the pro-
vider in the sense of raised costs, but are not shared by the other stages of the food 
marketing chain.  It is possible that a providing stage would benefit from economies 
of scope between products or between attributes as a consequence of mandatory pro-
vision, but the model scenarios examined here did not yield such a result. 
 
As shown repeatedly in this report, the costs to the food marketing chain are heavily 
influenced by the technologies being applied at each one of its stages.  The example 
of bacteria-free beef is examined in some detail, to show that the cheapest provider 
may be either the farm or processing stage, depending on the presence and nature of 
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economies of scale and scope.  Moreover, the impacts of provision can be magnified 
by unfavourable shares of price premia, which will increase profits accruing to other 
stages of the food marketing chain.  In the case of bacteria-free eggs, the costs to the 
food chain as a whole, and to the providing firms, are affected quite differently by 
technology: provision with economies of scope incurs extra costs at farm stage but 
cost savings at processing stage. 
Subsidy 
The results presented in this paper identify, across a range of scenarios, products and 
attributes, the subsidy necessary to evoke attribute provision.  In some cases, its re-
sults are surprising (albeit dependent on data): subsidies for provision of bacteria-free 
eggs would always be cheaper to pay to farmers, despite mandates and accompanying 
subsidies frequently being applied at processing stage.  In other cases, the model 
demonstrates the information discrepancy inherent in any subsidy programme: the 
stage at which the cheapest subsidy might be paid is highly dependent on cost and 
revenue data that is likely to be known only by commercial agents. 
5.5. Limitations and possible extensions 
Data 
The data used in this paper are, at best, estimates.  The analysis is intended to mimic 
the influence of specific variables and parameters on attribute provision, relative to a 
baseline, rather than to accurately estimate costs and benefits of change in the food 
marketing chain.  The model, and the analysis presented here, would benefit from im-
proved data, particularly from commercial firms. 
Applications 
The model addresses a multi-sector problem at a high level of aggregation.  The 
model is possibly better suited to analysis of a set of clearly-defined and closely-
related products.  The model has the capacity for within-factory or within-firm analy-
sis of tightly-grouped products, or other more focused analyses (e.g. of regions or sin-
gle sectors). 
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Non-provision costs 
The model would benefit from the inclusion of costs to the marketing chain other than 
those of provision.  In particular, costs of preservation of an attribute and generation 
and transmission of signals have not been addressed here.  They would make excel-
lent extensions to the model. 
Mix of endogeneous and exogenous variables 
The analysis is partial-equilibrium in nature.  It ignores market-clearing impacts, par-
ticularly those associated with the dilution of attributes’ price premia as a conse-
quence of supply response across a large number of firms.  This limitation might be 
overcome by introducing decay mechanisms for price premia that are dependent on 
aggregate supply elasticities.  Full endogenization of prices would be difficult in the 
presence of exogenously-determined transmission of shares of price premia.  Endoge-
nous premia might also be offered as an extension of the model. 
 
Where market-clearing mechanisms were used, a further extension becomes possible, 
in generating welfare measures beyond the profitability of isolated firms.  Consumer 
and producer surplus, for example, could be derived from demand and supply specifi-
cations.  In the case of large retail firms’ aggregate value added might be employed as 
a welfare measure.  
Risk 
Consideration of risk is a further desirable extension of the model.  The certainty with 
which price premia occur, and cost advantages can be captured, offer one avenue of 
extension.  Another is the risks inherent within-chain negotiation: the certainty with 
which agents can expect to receive proscribed shares of price premia.  A third is the 
incorporation of each stage’s risk preferences into decision-making.  
Industry organisation 
Institutional arrangements have not been addressed in this paper.  In particular, farm-
ers may share fixed costs in co-operatives and so offset the costs of provision of at-
tributes that require large investments.  Similar effects are likely for processing and 
retail firms that manage multiple establishments and so are able to share costs of certi-
fication, promotion and activities such as testing.  Scale effects, in particular, are 
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more likely to be enjoyed by very large processors, and scope effects by retailers with 
a very large range of products and attributes on offer. 
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DATA SOURCES 
Table A.1.  Data sources 
   
Category Comments Source 
   
Farm costs Typical values drawn from farm cost 
studies.  
Porskrog et al. (2003); Sparks (2003); Galletto 
(2003); Offermann and Nieberg (2002) 
Processing costs Generalized measures drawn from 
processing costs studies.  Specific 
costs of attribute provision drawn 
from specialized studies. 
Roche (2001); Sparks (2003); Erba et al. 
(1997); Maltsberger and Kalaitzandonakes 
(2000); ABARE (1994); Statistics Canada 
(2003); Ward (1993); Morrison Paul (2001) 
Retail costs Based on price differentials and a 
specialized study of attribute provi-
sion 
Sparks (2003); Baker (2003); U.K. Competition 
Commission (2000) 
Consumer price 
premia 
Drawn from a variety of reports Hobbs (2003); Offermann and Nieberg (2002); 
Galletto (2003)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
